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Market microstructure : Intermediaries and the theory of the firm (Record no. 15411)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 04025nam a2200217Ia 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20210906121158.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 160316s1999 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 0521659787
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Transcribing agency n
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 338.5 SPU
Item number SPU
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Spulber Daniel F
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Market microstructure : Intermediaries and the theory of the firm
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Cambridge
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 1999
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 374p
Dimensions xxix
365 ## - TRADE PRICE
Price amount Rs.977.50
505 ## - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note <br/>Contents;<br/>Preface and acknowledgments;<br/>Introduction;<br/>Part I: Market microstructure and the intermediation theory of the firm;<br/>1 Market microstructure and intermediation;<br/> 1.1 Who decides?<br/> 1.2 The circular flow of economic activity;<br/> 1.3 Comparison with other economic theories of the firm;<br/> 1.4 Intermediation in the U.S. economy;<br/> 1.5 Conclusion;<br/> 2 Price setting and intermediation by firms;<br/> 2.1 Price setting by intermediaries;<br/> 2.2 Allocation under uncertainty and over time;<br/> 2.3 Price adjustment by intermediaries;<br/> 2.4 Inventories and market clearing by intermediaries;<br/> 2.5 Conclusion;<br/>Part II: Competition and market equilibrium;<br/>3 Competition between intermediaries;<br/> 3.1 Bertrand competition for inputs with homogeneous products;<br/> 3.2 Bertrand price competition with differentiated products and purchases;<br/> 3.3 Bertrand competition with switching costs;<br/> 3.4 Bertrand competition when costs differ;<br/> 3.5 Conclusion;<br/>4 Intermediation and general equilibrium;<br/> 4.1 The neoclassical theory of the firm;<br/> 4.2 Transaction costs and Walrasian equilibrium;<br/> 4.3 Monopoly intermediation in general equilibrium;<br/> 4.4 Monopolistic competition;<br/> 4.5 Conclusion;<br/>Appendix;<br/>Part III: Intermediation versus decentralized trade;<br/>5 Matching and intermediation by firms;<br/> 5.1 Intermediation versus a matching market;<br/> 5.2 Costly intermediation;<br/> 5.3 Intermediation with random matching;<br/> 5.4 Intermediation and matching with production;<br/> 5.5 Conclusion;<br/> 6 Search and intermediation by firms;<br/> 6.1 The market model;<br/> 6.2 Market equilibrium;<br/> 6.3 Comparison with Walrasian equilibrium and with monopoly;<br/> 6.4 Market equilibrium with continual entry of consumers and suppliers;<br/> 6.5 Conclusion;<br/>Appendix;<br/>Part IV: Intermediation under asymmetric information;<br/>7 Adverse selection in product markets;<br/> 7.1 Intermediated trade;<br/> 7.2 Intermediated trade with production;<br/> 7.3 Market clearing by intermediaries;<br/> 7.4 Product quality and guaranties by experts;<br/> 7.5 Conclusion;<br/>Appendix;<br/>8 Adverse selection in financial markets;<br/> 8.1 Insiders, liquidity traders, and specialists;<br/> 8.2 Competition between specialists;<br/> 8.3 Informed intermediaries;<br/> 8.4 Credit rationing by financial intermediaries;<br/> 8.5 Conclusion;<br/>Part V: Intermediation and transaction-cost theory;<br/>9. Transaction costs and the contractual theory of the firm;<br/> 9.1 Transaction costs versus management costs;<br/> 9.2 Transaction costs, uncertainty, and bounded rationality;<br/> 9.3 Transaction costs and opportunism;<br/> 9.4 Transaction costs and ownership;<br/> 9.5 Conclusion;<br/>10 Transaction costs and the intermediation theory of the firm;<br/> 10.1 Transaction costs and market microstructure;<br/> 10.2 Intermediation and vertical integration;<br/> 10.3 Intermediation and opportunism;<br/> 10.4 Intermediation and ownership;<br/> 10.5 Conclusion;<br/>Part VI: Intermediation and agency theory;<br/>II Agency and the organizational-incentive theory of the firm;<br/>11.1 Vertical integration and the boundaries of the firm;<br/> 11.2 Coordination of agents by the firm;<br/> 11.3 Delegation of authority by owners to managers;<br/> 11.4 Delegation of authority by managers to employees;<br/> 11.5 Conclusion;<br/> 12 Agency and the intermediation theory of the firm;<br/> 12.1 What is an agent?<br/> 12.2 Delegated bargaining;<br/> 12.3 Delegated competition;<br/> 12.4 Delegated monitoring;<br/> 12.5 Conclusion;<br/>Conclusion;<br/>References;<br/>Index;<br/>
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element 1. Industrial organizatin - Economic Theory2. Microeconomics3. Stock Exchanges
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name
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942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Dewey Decimal Classification
Koha item type BOOKs
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Cost, normal purchase price Total Checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Price effective from Koha item type
        NLS NLS Library Compactors 30/05/2017 977.50   338.5 SPU 15413 30/05/2017 30/05/2017 BOOKs