1.1 Charges against the Explanatory Use of "Needs" 9 1.2 Charges against the Normative Use: Too Fluid 11 1.3 Charges against the Normative Use: Too Easily Satisfied 14 1.4 Charges against the Normative Use: Too Clumsy 16 1.5 Foundations for Charges in Real Abuses 18 1.6 Mixed Prospects of Vindication 20 Two. THE CONCEPT OF NEEDS IN NORMATIVE USE APPLIED TO SOCIAL POLICY: BASIC ACCOUNT 29 2.1 The Relational Formula: Illuminating but Not the Last Word 29 2.2 At the Limits of the Relational Formula, a List of Course-of-Life Needs 32 2.3 Minimum Standards of Provision 38 2.4 A Criterion for Inclusion in the List and for Height of Standards 47 2.5 Consistency of the List and Standards; Completeness of the List 59 2.6 Given List, Standards, and Criterion, a Principle of Precedence 60 THREE. COMPLICATIONS SURROUNDING THE BASIC ACCOUNT: DERIVATION, CONVENTIONALITY, NORMATIVITY 81 3.1 Needs 82 3.2 Needs 90 CONTENTS 3.3 The Surviving Normative Force of Needs Derived and Conventional 104 3.4 Normativity 111 3.5 The Basic Account as a Schema for Expanded or Retracted Use 117 3.6 Abuses of the Concept of Needs 121 FOUR. THE PLACE OF NEEDS IN REASONING ABOUT JUSTICE 131 4.1 The Opportunity for Mutual Support 131 4.2 Needs Contingently Connected with Justice via Rights 133 4.3 Equality Unattractive When It Leaves Needs Unmet 138 4.4 Variable Favor for Needs under Literal Equality with Exceptions 140 4.5 Needs Logically Front and Center with Equality in Meeting Needs 143 4.6 Concern for Imposed by Practical Necessity on Conceptions of Justice That Disregard Equality 150 4.7 Concern for Needs Imposed by Practical Necessity on Conceptions of Justice 155 FIVE. UTILITARIANISM WITHOUT UTILITY 161 5.1 Censuses of Needs Replacing the Calculus of Utility 162 5.2 The Census Notional Work with the Principle of Precedence in the Revisionary Process 166 5.3 Defects of the Concept of Utility as Compared with the Concept of Needs 171 5.4 Liberalism Led Astray from Needs the Pareto Welfare Criterion 175 5.5 Utilitarianism, without Utility, Reunited with Liberalism 177 5.6 Provision for Preferences Strict Final Priority for Needs 179 CONTENTS Six. ATTENTION TO NEEDS WITH FURTHER ATTENTION TO PREFERENCES 189 6.1 Liberty 190 6.2 A Dead-End Path: Misguided Attempt to Have "Preferences" Entirely Supplant "Needs" 198 6.3 Another Path: From Strict Final Priority for Needs to Precautionary Priority 204 6.4 From Precautionary Priority to Role-Relative Precautionary Priority 210 6.5 Planners Differing Consumers Both in Roles and in Persons: The Erosion of Priority 218 6.6 Attention to Preferences at Odds with Justice 226 SEVEN. THE EXPANSION OF NEEDS 231 7.1 Is the Two-Part List Unduly Narrow? 232 7.2 The Advantages of Expansion 235 7.3 The Expansion May Take 238 7.4 The Risks of Expansion 254 EIGHT. THE CONCEPT OF NEEDS AT THREE POINTS OF BREAKDOWN 261 8.1 A Breakdown Merely Hypothetical? Needs That Are Embarrassments Moral Dignity 264 8.2 A Breakdown Real and Imminent: The Claims of a Worldwide Reference Population 276 8.3 A Breakdown: Real and Current: The Bottomless Pit of Medical Care 293 8.4 Yet Elsewhere, Lo! Continuing Work for the Concept of Needs 301 NOTES 307 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 329 INDEX 335