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The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient/ Donald Wittman
Publication details: Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, c1995,Description: ix, 229 pages 22cmISBN:- 9780226904238
- 321.8 WIT
Contents:
Acknowledgments
1: Introduction: The Market Metaphor
2: The Informed Voter
3: Electoral-Market Competition and the Control of Opportunistic Behavior
4: Transaction Costs and the Design of Government institutions
5: Homo Economicus versus Homo Psychologicus: Why Cognitive Psychology Does
Not Explain Democratic Politics
6: Legislative Markets and Organization
7: Pressure Groups
8: Bureaucratic Markets: Why Government Bureaucracies Are Efficient and Not
Too Large
9: The Market for Regulation
10: The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract and the Role of
Transaction Costs in Constitutional Design
11: Majority Rule and Preference Aggregation
12: The Distribution of Economic Wealth and Political Power
13: The Testing of Theory
14: Epilogue: The Burden of Proof
References
Author Index
Subject index
| Item type | Current library | Shelving location | Call number | Status | Notes | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
BOOKs
|
NLS | General Stacks | 321.8 WIT (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | Recommended by Dr. Manpreet Singh Dhillon | 40263 |
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Acknowledgments
1: Introduction: The Market Metaphor
2: The Informed Voter
3: Electoral-Market Competition and the Control of Opportunistic Behavior
4: Transaction Costs and the Design of Government institutions
5: Homo Economicus versus Homo Psychologicus: Why Cognitive Psychology Does
Not Explain Democratic Politics
6: Legislative Markets and Organization
7: Pressure Groups
8: Bureaucratic Markets: Why Government Bureaucracies Are Efficient and Not
Too Large
9: The Market for Regulation
10: The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract and the Role of
Transaction Costs in Constitutional Design
11: Majority Rule and Preference Aggregation
12: The Distribution of Economic Wealth and Political Power
13: The Testing of Theory
14: Epilogue: The Burden of Proof
References
Author Index
Subject index