000			04025nam a2200217Ia 4500
999			_c15411 _d15411
003			OSt
005			20210906121158.0
008			160316s1999 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a0521659787
040			_cn
082			_a338.5 SPU _bSPU
100			_aSpulber Daniel F
245			_aMarket microstructure : Intermediaries and the theory of the firm
260			_aCambridge _bCambridge University Press _c1999
300			_a374p _cxxix
365			_bRs.977.50
505			_a Contents; Preface and acknowledgments; Introduction; Part I: Market microstructure and the intermediation theory of the firm; 1 Market microstructure and intermediation; 1.1 Who decides? 1.2 The circular flow of economic activity; 1.3 Comparison with other economic theories of the firm; 1.4 Intermediation in the U.S. economy; 1.5 Conclusion; 2 Price setting and intermediation by firms; 2.1 Price setting by intermediaries; 2.2 Allocation under uncertainty and over time; 2.3 Price adjustment by intermediaries; 2.4 Inventories and market clearing by intermediaries; 2.5 Conclusion; Part II: Competition and market equilibrium; 3 Competition between intermediaries; 3.1 Bertrand competition for inputs with homogeneous products; 3.2 Bertrand price competition with differentiated products and purchases; 3.3 Bertrand competition with switching costs; 3.4 Bertrand competition when costs differ; 3.5 Conclusion; 4 Intermediation and general equilibrium; 4.1 The neoclassical theory of the firm; 4.2 Transaction costs and Walrasian equilibrium; 4.3 Monopoly intermediation in general equilibrium; 4.4 Monopolistic competition; 4.5 Conclusion; Appendix; Part III: Intermediation versus decentralized trade; 5 Matching and intermediation by firms; 5.1 Intermediation versus a matching market; 5.2 Costly intermediation; 5.3 Intermediation with random matching; 5.4 Intermediation and matching with production; 5.5 Conclusion; 6 Search and intermediation by firms; 6.1 The market model; 6.2 Market equilibrium; 6.3 Comparison with Walrasian equilibrium and with monopoly; 6.4 Market equilibrium with continual entry of consumers and suppliers; 6.5 Conclusion; Appendix; Part IV: Intermediation under asymmetric information; 7 Adverse selection in product markets; 7.1 Intermediated trade; 7.2 Intermediated trade with production; 7.3 Market clearing by intermediaries; 7.4 Product quality and guaranties by experts; 7.5 Conclusion; Appendix; 8 Adverse selection in financial markets; 8.1 Insiders, liquidity traders, and specialists; 8.2 Competition between specialists; 8.3 Informed intermediaries; 8.4 Credit rationing by financial intermediaries; 8.5 Conclusion; Part V: Intermediation and transaction-cost theory; 9. Transaction costs and the contractual theory of the firm; 9.1 Transaction costs versus management costs; 9.2 Transaction costs, uncertainty, and bounded rationality; 9.3 Transaction costs and opportunism; 9.4 Transaction costs and ownership; 9.5 Conclusion; 10 Transaction costs and the intermediation theory of the firm; 10.1 Transaction costs and market microstructure; 10.2 Intermediation and vertical integration; 10.3 Intermediation and opportunism; 10.4 Intermediation and ownership; 10.5 Conclusion; Part VI: Intermediation and agency theory; II Agency and the organizational-incentive theory of the firm; 11.1 Vertical integration and the boundaries of the firm; 11.2 Coordination of agents by the firm; 11.3 Delegation of authority by owners to managers; 11.4 Delegation of authority by managers to employees; 11.5 Conclusion; 12 Agency and the intermediation theory of the firm; 12.1 What is an agent? 12.2 Delegated bargaining; 12.3 Delegated competition; 12.4 Delegated monitoring; 12.5 Conclusion; Conclusion; References; Index;
650			_a1. Industrial organizatin - Economic Theory2. Microeconomics3. Stock Exchanges
700			_a _a
942			_2ddc _cBK