000			01676cam a2200217 a 4500
003			OSt
005			20260219085219.0
008			970128s1997 enka b 001 0 eng
020			_a978063120668
020			_a0631206663
082			_a306.4 MOL
100	1		_aMolho, Ian.
245	1	4	_aThe economics of information : _blying and cheating in markets and organizations / _cIan Molho.
260			_aOxford ; _bBlackwell, _c1997.
300			_ax, 262 p. : _bill. ; _c23 cm.
505			_a1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action. Part I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons. . 2. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons. 3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model. 4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence. Part II: Signalling. 5. Job Market Signalling. 6. Screening: A Self-Selection Mechanism. 7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory. 8. Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence. Part III: Moral Hazard. 9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations. 10. Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model. 11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory. 12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence. Part IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and Auctions. . 13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example. 14. Auction Design: Theory. 15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence. 16. Concluding Comments. Appendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule, Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory. Index.
650		0	_aInformation theory in economics.
650		0	_aUncertainty.
650		0	_aDecision making.
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c19921 _d19921