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999			_c211302 _d211302
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003			OSt
005			20220505102511.0
008			210525s2021 enk b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2021025423
020			_a9781316517833 _q(hardback)
020			_a9781009048491 _q(paperback)
020			_z9781009047609 _q(epub)
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC
042			_apcc
050	0	0	_aK3289 _b.T848 2021
082	0	0	_a342.04 TUS _223
100	1		_aTushnet, Mark V., _d1945- _eauthor.
245	1	4	_aThe New Fourth Branch : _bInstitutions for Protecting Constitutional Democracy / _cMark Tushnet, Harvard Law School, Massachusetts.
263			_a2110
264		1	_aCambridge, United Kingdom ; _aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _c2021.
300			_apages cm.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
365			_b2409
490	0		_aComparative constitutional law and policy
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aIntroduction; Why a fourth branch? the structural logic; Why a fourth branch? the functional logic; Design issues in general; Design principles in practice : A survey; Anticorruption investigations : Case studies from Brazil and South Africa; Electoral commissions : Case Studies from India, the United States, and South Korea; Audit agencies; Conclusion.
520			_a"Chapter Nine of South Africa's Constitution is titled, "State Institutions Protecting Constitutional Democracy." Its list of institutions that "strengthen constitutional democracy" includes the Public Prosecutor, the Human Rights Commission, the Auditor-General, and the Electoral Commission. Seen in the context of the Constitution's written text, these institutions form a branch on a par with Parliament and the President. Textual placement may not be important in itself. The authors of the South African Constitution were on to something important, though. They saw that the traditional Montesqueian enumeration of three and only three branches of government no longer identified the complete set of desiderata for institutional design. Dissatisfaction with the Montesquiean enumeration was apparent as well in Roberto Mangabeira Unger's False Necessity, published in 1987. That enumeration, Unger wrote, was "dangerous" because it "generates a stifling and perverse institutional logic...." The solution for Unger lay in multiplying the number of branches. He offered several examples: a branch "especially charged with enlarging access to the means of communication, information, and expertise," and a branch - labeled the "destabilization branch" - designed "to give every transformative practice a chance.""-- _cProvided by publisher.
650		0	_aConstitutional Law.
650		0	_aIndependent Regulatory Commissions.
650		0	_aSeparation of Powers.
776	0	8	_iOnline version: _aTushnet, Mark V., 1945- _tNew fourth branch _dCambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2021 _z9781009047609 _w(DLC) 2021025424
906			_a7 _bcbc _corignew _d1 _eecip _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2ddc _cBK