000			01440nam a2200229Ia 4500
999			_c21782 _d21782
003			OSt
005			20211004163628.0
008			160316s1998 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780201847581
040			_cn
082			_a330.010000 _bBIE
100			_aBierman H Scott
245			_aGame thoery with economic applications
250			_a2nd
260			_aDelhi _bPearson Education Pvt. Ltd. _c1998
300			_a452p _cxv
365			_bRs.250
505			_aContents I. STATIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION. 1. Nash Equilibrium. 2. Oligopoly. 3. Strategic Trade Policy. 4. Property Rights and Efficiency. 5. Voting Games. II. DYNAMIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION. 6. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. 7. Bargaining. 8. Time-Consistent Macroeconomy Policy. 9. Repeated Games and Dynamic Competition. III. GAMES WITH UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES. 10. Uncertainty and Expected Utility. 11. Moral Hazard and Incomplete Insurance. 12. Moral Hazard and Involuntary Unemployment. IV. STATIC GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. 13. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. 14. Auctions. V. DYNAMIC GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. 15. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. 16. Bargaining with Private Information. 17. Corporate Takeovers and Greenmail. 18. Adverse Selection and Credit Rationing. 19. Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence. 20. Cartel Enforcement.
650			_a1. Game Theory2. Decision Making
700			_a _a
942			_2ddc _cBK