000			01473nam a2200217Ia 4500
999			_c37287 _d37287
003			OSt
005			20210405131256.0
008			160316s2013 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9781781956045
040			_cn
082			_a343.072100 _bFIL
100			_aFilippelli Marilena
245			_aCollective dominance and collusion : Parallelism in EU and US competition law
260			_aLondon _bEdward Elgar _c2013
300			_a242p _cxx
365			_b Rs. 9,355
505			_aContents: Introduction; Part I: Parallelism in US Competition Law; 1. US Antitrust Policy Towards Parallelism: The Ex Post Enforcement; 2. The US Merger Policy Towards Collusion Part II: Parallelism in EU Competition Law; 3. First Evidence of the ‘Oligopoly Problem’ in the Enforcement of EU Antitrust Laws; 4. The First Stage of EU Oligopoly Control: Shaping the Category of Collective Dominance; 5. Airtours and its Aftermath Part III: A Suggested Approach to Collective Dominance; 6. Coordinated Effects in EU Merger Control; 7. Abuses of Collective Dominance Section I: Taxonomy of Collective Dominance Section 2: Dealing with Tacit Collusion; 8. Lessons from Collective Dominance: Re-thinking the Relationship of Articles 101 and 102 Concluding Remarks: EU and US Approach to the Oligopoly Problem: An Economic-based Trend toward Convergence; Bibliography; Index
650			_a1. Antitrust Law - European Union Countries - U S A
700			_a _a
942			_2ddc _cBK