000			02679nam a2200217Ia 4500
999			_c40552 _d40552
003			OSt
005			20200924163259.0
008			160316s2011 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9781849801362
040			_cNLS
082			_a346.066260 _bMCC
100			_aMcChesney Fred S
245			_aMergers and the market for corporate control
260			_aLondon _bEdward Elgar _c2011
300			_a666p _cix
365			_b Rs. 20,137
505			_aTable of contents Contents: Acknowledgements Introduction Fred S. McChesney PART I BACKGROUND 1. R.H. Coase (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm' PART II THE PERECEIVED PROBLEM 2. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means (1933), 'The Divergence of Interest between Ownership and Control' 3. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure' 4. Michael C. Jensen (1986), 'Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers' PART III MERGERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 5. Henry G. Manne (1965), 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control' 6. William J. Carney (1999), 'The Legacy of "The Market for Corporate Control" and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm' 7. Fred S. McChesney (1999), 'Manne, Mergers, and the Market for Corporate Control' PART IV HOW THE MARKET OPERATES: INTERNAL ISSUES 8. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), 'The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer' 9. Lucian A. Bebchuk (1982), 'The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers' 10. David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1987), 'Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers' 11. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1982), 'Corporate Control Transactions' 12. Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas (2004), 'The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions' PART V HOW THE MARKET OPERATES: EXTERNAL ISSUES 13. William J. Carney and Leonard A. Silverstein (2003), 'The Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill' 14. Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1985), 'A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail' 15. John C. Coates, IV (2001), 'Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers' PART VI EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 16. Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), 'The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence' 17. Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley and Jeffry M. Netter (1988) 'The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980'
650			_a1. Consolidation & Merger Of Corporations2. Corporate Power
700			_a _a
942			_2ddc _cBK